Exposing the Science (and Other Factors) Behind OELs
Image: A 3D illustration of a benzene molecule. Credit: Getty Images / Model-La
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Occupational exposure limits, or OELs, provide enforceable thresholds that OEHS professionals may use to evaluate risks and justify controls for hazardous chemicals. Yet the process of deriving OELs is poorly understood. According to Michele Twilley, DrPH, CIH, the chief science officer at AIHA, many OEHS grad students never take courses on OEL development. They learn to use OELs to make exposure decisions, Twilley said, “but the derivation is a whole art and science to itself.”
To set chemical exposure limits, government agencies and standard-setting organizations draw on sources such as epidemiological studies, toxicological data, and in vitro, ex vivo, and in silico experiments. Non-scientific factors such as policy and legal precedent also influence OEL development. For example, OSHA often sets OELs for carcinogens based on the agency’s estimation of the risk of one excess cancer case occurring per every 10,000 exposed workers. “That one-in-10,000 limit was an arbitrary decision by the courts,” Twilley explained. “It had nothing to do with science, but OSHA has to abide by it.”
“All of those different approaches to establishing exposure limits and making risk decisions—a lot of them are procedural, and we want to get at the science,” she said. “What does the science tell us to do?”
The Benzene Case
The history of benzene regulation demonstrates the interaction between science, policy, and law. Benzene is used as a fuel additive and in manufacturing solvents, degreasers, plastics, rubber, resins, dyes, and other products. Its carcinogenicity has been documented for over a century; an 1897 report cited the death from leukemia of a worker exposed to benzene. In 1948, the American Petroleum Institute (API) published a study linking benzene to leukemia and concluded there is no safe level of benzene exposure. However, it is still one of the 20 most commonly used chemicals in the United States.
In 1971, the newly-established Occupational Safety and Health Administration set the permissible exposure limit for benzene to 10 ppm. NIOSH published a criteria document on the benzene-leukemia link in 1974 and requested an emergency temporary standard in 1976. The next year, OSHA issued an ETS lowering the PEL for benzene to 1 ppm. The agency conducted hearings to review the scientific evidence and promulgated a final rule in 1978, intending to make the change permanent. This rule was challenged by labor unions, individual companies, and representatives of the chemical, iron and steel, rubber, and petroleum industries, including the API.
In the 1980 case Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute—also known as the Benzene Case—the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had determined that OSHA’s final rule was “based on findings unsupported by the administrative record” and therefore invalid. That is, the courts held that OSHA’s documentation did not contain enough evidence to justify lowering the PEL to 1 ppm.
One of the most important outcomes of the Benzene Case was the creation of the idea of “significant risk.” According to Justice John Paul Stevens, writing the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion for the case:
Some risks are plainly acceptable, and others are plainly unacceptable. If, for example, the odds are one in a billion that a person will die from cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated water, the risk clearly could not be considered significant. On the other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors that are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it. Although the Agency has no duty to calculate the exact probability of harm, it does have an obligation to find that a significant risk is present before it can characterize a place of employment as "unsafe."
Before the Benzene Case, OSHA had assumed there were no safe exposure levels for carcinogens and had sought to reduce occupational benzene exposures to the lowest feasible level. Justice Stevens claimed the Court did not intend to impose a “mathematical straitjacket” on OSHA and did not prescribe a specific numerical threshold for “significant risk.” Nor has OSHA officially adopted one, and it has affirmed the “no safe level” philosophy with respect to carcinogens. But in practice, OSHA and other regulatory agencies have come to evaluate excess cancer case rates between one in 1,000,000 and one in 1,000—within the range suggested by the plurality opinion.
Choosing Appropriate OELs
The Benzene Case also illustrates the difficulty of changing federal exposure limits. It was not until 1987—10 years after the initial ETS was issued—that OSHA finally succeeded in permanently lowering the PEL for benzene to 1 ppm as an eight-hour time-weighted average.
Because U.S. federal regulatory limits may be insufficiently protective, OEHS professionals in this country often must rely on limits set by private organizations, including AIHA and ACGIH. They may also draw on regulatory limits set in other countries, such as the German MAKs. This can require OEHS professionals to choose between several competing OELs.
According to Twilley, understanding the science behind OEL derivation enables a practitioner to make informed decisions. “Say, one is an exposure limit of one part per million for an eight-hour time-weighted average, and the other one says you can be exposed up to 10 parts per million for an eight-hour time-weighted average,” she said. “I want to know why there's a difference.” One OEL may be based on more recent information. Another may apply too many uncertainty factors. OEL documentation often clarifies the point of departure used to determine the limit in question. “When you read these supporting documents that go along with every one of these exposure limits, you learn the science behind it, what the derivation was based on.”
But the OEHS professional must take care to select an exposure limit that is neither too risky nor too conservative. “If you're overly cautious, and you drive these numbers too low, you might be increasing risk elsewhere,” Twilley said. She noted that unnecessary personal protective equipment and other controls may increase physical and mental stress on workers. “Conversely, you don't want them too high, that you're inadvertently causing risk to workers from chemical exposures.”
Sharing Research
In Twilley’s view, understanding OEL derivation is “critically important for a practitioner to advance in this field.” Yet she acknowledged that OEL derivation is poorly understood outside of a small community of specialists. It’s imperative for these specialists to share their work with the broader OEHS profession and with each other.
One opportunity will be the 2027 Exposure Limits and Acceptable Risk Symposium, to be held May 22–23 at the George R. Brown Convention Center in Houston. Experts in toxicology, epidemiology, statistical methods, law, and policy, as well as representatives of regulatory authorities from all over the world, are encouraged to submit the abstracts of original research papers related to risk and OELs. Those whose proposals are accepted will be invited to speak at the symposium, which will be attended by professionals in OEHS and other fields.
“We're laying out the background and the basics for what industrial hygienists and policy makers need to know,” said Twilley, who is one of the symposium organizers. “This is the scientific, technical part, where we’re able to learn best practices from each other based on the research and then hopefully synthesize all of our learnings.”
The 2027 Exposure Limits and Acceptable Risk Symposium will be one of the events associated with AIHA Connect 2027, occurring May 24–26 in Houston. Interested parties may submit papers until 11:59 p.m. Eastern time on Jan. 13, 2027. To learn more about the symposium, view the call for proposals.
Resources:
Allen Stewart: “The History of Benzene Use.”
CDC: “What Is an Acceptable Risk of Cancer Due to Occupational Exposure to a Carcinogen?” (Jan. 3, 2015).
Environmental Health Perspectives: “Law and Regulation of Benzene” (1989).
Justia: “Indus. Union Dept. v. Amer. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).”
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government: "It All Started with Benzene" (PDF).
The Regulatory Review: “Private Standards and the Benzene Case” (Aug. 29, 2022).
Comments
The Science Behind the OEL
This article is very timely in light of the 5th Circuit Court's decision on the EPA TSCA Methylene Chloride Risk Management Rule. The Court's comments on the inappropriately set EPA OEL (ECEL) further support this article. Setting OELs must be left to the experts. There so much scientific consideration, collaboration and experience required to not only set these limits but also maintain them. The OEHS professionals using these OELs would be well served to not only understand the science behind the OEL, but also understand how to effectively implement workplace controls, PPE, etc without introducing other hazards. Schools of Public Health and a variety of accreditation programs would be well served to place more emphasis on not only OEL development, but the science surrounding the establishment and maintenance of the OEL as well as the health and safety considerations for effective implementation in the workplace.
By MaryAnn Hoff on November 13, 2026 9:08am